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Note 
No Longer Available: Critiquing the 
Contradictory Ways Courts Treat Exclusive 
Arbitration Forum Clauses when the Forum Can 
No Longer Arbitrate 
Nicole Wanlass* 
Joyce Green, a senior citizen living on social security, en-
tered into a loan in 2012 with two companies collectively known 
as “the Loan Machine.”
1
 With a 36% annual percentage rate 
(APR), the loan terms Joyce Green agreed to were not exactly 
favorable.
2
 However, after the Loan Machine compounded the 
loan with various fees, the actual interest rate was around 
200% APR.
3
 Thus, even after paying back $983.93 over three 
months, Green still owed $1,533.67 on her original $1,650 
loan.
4
 Furthermore, Green only discovered this deception 
months later when she requested billing statements from the 
Loan Machine.
5
 
The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause which 
stated that all disputes would “be resolved by binding arbitra-
tion by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of 
the National Arbitration Forum.”
6
 However, the National Arbi-
tration Forum (NAF) has not been accepting consumer arbitra-
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. Bio-
medical Engineering Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota; B.S. 2012, 
Texas A&M University. I’d like to thank my family for always being so sup-
portive of me, particularly throughout my law school journey. I’d also like to 
thank the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review who worked so hard 
to bring this Note to print. Copyright © 2015 by Nicole Wanlass.  
 1. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 2–3, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., 
LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1262), 2013 WL 1886964; Paul 
Bland, Activist Seventh Circuit Panel Helps Out Payday Lender Re-Writing 
Arbitration Clause Picking Corrupt Firm, PUB. JUST. (Aug. 2, 2013), http:// 
publicjustice.net/blog/activist-seventh-circuit-panel-helps-out-payday-lender 
-by-re-writing-arbitration-clause. 
 2. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 1, at 3. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. at 4. 
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tions since July 2009.
7
 Refusing to accept new consumer arbi-
trations was part of the NAF’s settlement agreement with the 
Minnesota Attorney General over its fraudulent and deceptive 
trade practices.
8
 Notwithstanding the NAF’s unavailability, 
when Joyce Green brought her dispute to court, the Loan Ma-
chine moved to compel arbitration.
9
 The Seventh Circuit upheld 
the motion and remanded the case, instructing the district 
court to appoint an arbitrator for the parties who would employ 
the NAF Procedures.
10
 
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, illustrates an is-
sue that has plagued state and federal courts alike for years: 
What should a court do when the parties’ contract includes an 
exclusive arbitration forum agreement and the arbitration fo-
rum cannot, or refuses to, hear the dispute?
11
 While this “exclu-
sive arbitration forum dispute” issue may not appear to be sub-
stantial, whether a court hears the case or appoints a new 
arbitrator can have a huge effect on someone like Joyce Green. 
Green’s loan agreement referred any disputes to the NAF, 
which had not been accepting arbitrations for nearly three 
years due to its fraudulent practices against consumers.
12
 As 
such, it is clear that the Loan Machine was either (a) indolent 
in its drafting, or (b) trying to get around the fact that it could 
no longer employ the pro-creditor NAF as a forum.
13
 Beyond the 
consumer implications, however, these exclusive arbitration fo-
rum disputes are important because they raise issues of con-
tract interpretation (as exclusive arbitration agreements are 
contractually created) and statutory interpretation (as courts 
have decided these issues under the Federal Arbitration Act), 
with courts conflictingly interpreting the same contractual and 
 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. See id.; Firm Agrees To End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/20credit 
.html. 
 9. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 1, at 5. 
 10. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788, 793 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
 11. See id. at 790–93 (discussing how various courts have approached this 
issue); Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398, 405–06 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (same). 
 12. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 1, at 2–5; Firm Agrees To 
End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, supra note 8. The dissenting judge certain-
ly thought this was the situation. Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dis-
senting) (“When U.S. Cash Advance was still providing for arbitration by the 
Forum in 2012, was it being negligent or deliberately deceptive?”).  
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statutory language.
14
 
This Note argues that the solution to this issue is two-fold: 
practitioners need to more clearly draft these types of clauses, 
and the courts must adopt consistent procedures for deciding 
exclusive arbitration forum disputes. This two-part solution 
will allow parties to better anticipate how a court will interpret 
contractual language creating an exclusive arbitration forum 
agreement. Part I of this Note discusses the types of situations 
that can cause an exclusive arbitration forum to refuse to hear 
a dispute, and how courts typically decide whether to adjudi-
cate the dispute or send it to arbitration. It also discusses why 
parties may be concerned if the case goes to arbitration rather 
than litigation. Part II examines the contradictory and prob-
lematic ways in which courts have interpreted the same basic 
contractual and statutory language. Part III proposes a two-
part solution. First, to ensure that exclusive arbitration dis-
putes never go to court in the first place, this Note contends 
that attorneys must take care to draft these agreements unam-
biguously, and sets out guidelines for doing so. Second, Part III 
argues that when courts do hear these disputes, they should 
base their rulings on uniformity and fairness. Specifically, this 
Note proposes that courts should focus more on the intentions 
of the parties, rather than just the plain language of the con-
tract, and appoint a new arbitrator pursuant to their statutori-
ly-granted power only when the parties intended to arbitrate 
regardless of whether or not the exclusive arbitration forum 
was available. 
I. WHY EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES 
ARISE AND HOW COURTS CURRENTLY HANDLE THEM  
This Part discusses the background behind exclusive arbi-
tration forum disputes and the ways in which courts decide 
how to rule on them. First, Section A outlines the circumstanc-
es under which arbitration forums that parties have exclusively 
agreed to have nevertheless declined to hear those parties’ dis-
putes. Section A also discusses the prevalence of these exclu-
sive arbitration forum disputes. Next, Section B discusses the 
approaches courts have used to determine whether to adjudi-
cate an exclusive arbitration forum dispute or submit it to arbi-
 
 14. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 792–93 (holding that 9 
U.S.C. § 5 gave the court the authority to appoint a new arbitrator); In re Sa-
lomon S’holders’ Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 559–61 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding 
that 9 U.S.C. § 5 did not give the court the authority to appoint a new arbitra-
tor). 
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tration. Finally, Section C describes why parties may want 
their suit to end up in litigation, rather than arbitration, and 
thus why this issue may be an important one to parties that 
face it. 
A. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT CAUSE, AND THE PREVALENCE OF, 
EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES 
Exclusive arbitration forums refuse or are unable to hear 
disputes for a number of reasons. The forum may no longer be 
in existence by the time the dispute arises.
15
 The forum may 
have changed its policies since, or even before, the parties 
drafted the contract so that the arbitration clause is no longer 
enforceable in that forum.
16
 The forum may have posted a mor-
atorium on the parties’ type of dispute.
17
 If the forum limits ar-
bitration to members, the party with the membership may have 
lost good standing with the forum since entering into the con-
tract.
18
 If the forum has discretion to do so, it may decline to 
hear the dispute.
19
 Or, in rare cases, the forum may have never 
 
 15. See, e.g., Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1220–22 
(11th Cir. 2000) (noting that the parties agreed to arbitration by the NAF, 
which was no longer in existence); Ex parte Warren, 718 So. 2d 45, 46–47 (Ala. 
1998) (noting that the parties agreed to arbitration by the National Academy 
of Conciliators, which had since gone out of existence). 
 16. See, e.g., New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern ex rel. 
Petscher, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing how the 
parties agreed to arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
but that the AAA had changed its policies, even before the parties entered into 
the agreement, to only accept cases where the patient entered into the agree-
ment post-dispute); Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 
435, 436–37 (S.C. 2009) (discussing how the parties agreed to arbitration by 
the National Health Lawyers Association but that the forum “no longer arbi-
trate[s] personal injury claims arising under pre-injury arbitration agree-
ments”).  
 17. See, e.g., QuickClick Loans, LLC v. Russell, 943 N.E.2d 166, 168–70 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that the parties agreed to arbitration by either the 
NAF or the AAA but that the AAA had since issued a moratorium on certain 
debt collection cases); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 558–
59 (W. Va. 2013) (same).  
 18. See, e.g., Dover Ltd. v. A.B. Watley, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7366(FM), 2006 
WL 2987054, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006) (noting that the parties agreed 
to arbitration by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which 
will not arbitrate for terminated members without the other party’s consent; 
that the NASD terminated the defendant’s membership; and that the plaintiff 
did not consent). 
 19. See, e.g., Salomon, 68 F.3d at 556 (discussing how the parties agreed 
to arbitration through the New York Stock Exchange, which has the discretion 
to refuse to hear a case and did so with the parties because it found that it had 
neither the jurisdiction nor the expertise to hear the dispute); Zechman v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359, 1362–63 (N.D. 
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conducted arbitrations
20
 or never existed in the first place.
21
 
Most recently, the primary reason courts face exclusive ar-
bitration forum disputes is because the NAF has stopped ac-
cepting consumer arbitrations.
22
 Lori Swanson, the Minnesota 
Attorney General, sued the NAF for bias against consumers in 
July of 2009.
23
 The lawsuit included accusations of the NAF “vi-
olating state consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices and 
false advertising laws by hiding financial ties to collection 
agencies and credit card companies.”
24
 More specifically, among 
the charges against the NAF were allegations that the NAF 
had ties with the debt-collection law firms representing credit 
card companies that arbitrated before it, and that a New York 
hedge fund “owned stakes in such collection law firms and the 
NAF, sending arbitration business between the two.”
25
 Three 
days after filing the complaint, Swanson and the NAF reached 
a settlement in which the NAF agreed to stop accepting all new 
consumer arbitrations nationwide.
26
 Swanson noted that the 
“alleged cross ownership” between the NAF and debt collection 
law firms helped give her the necessary leverage for the settle-
ment, though she also uncovered allegations that the NAF was 
even helping creditors write their cases.
27
 In simple terms, the 
NAF stopped accepting arbitrations because it was defrauding 
 
Ill. 1990) (discussing how the parties agreed to arbitration through the Chica-
go Board of Trade but that the Board declined to hear the parties’ dispute, 
possibly because of a conflict of interest). 
 20. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 
2014) (stating that the parties agreed to arbitration conducted by the Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribal Nation but that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Na-
tion does not conduct arbitrations). 
 21. See Laboratorios Grossman, S.A. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 
756, 757 (App. Div. 1968) (stating that the parties agreed to arbitration by the 
Pan-American Arbitration Association, which does not and never has existed). 
 22. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 351–53 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011 WL 5827208, at *1 
(W.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2011); Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 
Soc’y, No. 10-cv-1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 
2011); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 682–84 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2013); Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 327, 329–31 (Ill. 2011); Wright v. 
GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶¶ 1–7, 808 N.W.2d 114, 115–17. 
 23. Minnesota Sues a Credit Arbitrator, Citing Bias, BLOOMBERG BUS. 
(July 14, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/ 
jul2009/db20090714_952766.htm. 
 24. Firm Agrees To End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, supra note 8. 
 25. Robert Berner, Big Arbitration Firm Pulls Out of Credit Card Busi-
ness, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 19, 2009), http://www.businessweek 
.com/investing/wall_street_news_blog/archives/2009/07/big_arbitration.html. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
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consumers.
28
 
It is difficult to say how often exclusive arbitration forum 
disputes arise, as there is limited scholarly work on this issue. 
However, it appears that their numbers are on the rise, primar-
ily because of the NAF’s unavailability. For example, between 
1958
29
 and July 2009 only three circuits (the Second, Ninth, 
and Eleventh) had ruled on what to do in an exclusive arbitra-
tion forum dispute.
30
 In the almost six year period since July 
2009, that number has doubled with the Third, Fifth, and Sev-
enth Circuits also ruling on this issue
31
 and with yet another 
exclusive arbitration dispute coming before the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.
32
 This is unsurprising when one considers that the NAF, 
the largest provider of commercial debt arbitration services be-
fore shutting down, handled 214,000 claims in 2006 alone.
33
 
Moreover, based on articles published in magazines and online, 
it is apparent that this issue is becoming widespread enough to 
garner the attention of attorneys practicing arbitration law.
34
 
 
 28. See Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who 
Wins), BUS. WK., June 16, 2008, at 072–74 (“NAF presents its service in print 
and online advertising as quicker and less expensive than litigation but every 
bit as unbiased. Its Web site promotes ‘a fair, efficient, and effective system for 
the resolution of commercial and civil disputes in America and worldwide.’ But 
internal NAF documents and interviews with people familiar with the firm 
reveal a different reality. Behind closed doors, NAF sells itself to lenders as an 
effective tool for collecting debts. The point of these pitches is to persuade the 
companies to use the firm to resolve clashes over delinquent accounts. . . . At 
times, NAF does this kind of marketing with the aid of law firms representing 
the very creditors it’s trying to sign up as clients.”). 
 29. One of the first (if not the first) exclusive arbitration forum disputes 
occurred in 1958. See Delma Eng’g Corp. v. K & L Constr. Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d 
620, 621 (App. Div. 1958). 
 30. See Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1059–61 (9th Cir. 2006), 
abrogated on other grounds by Atl. Nat’l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 
621 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2010); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 
F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative 
Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 557–61 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 31. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 
2013); Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 353–57 (3d Cir. 2012); Ranzy v. 
Tijerina, 393 F. App’x 174 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 32. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 33. Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embed-
ded Neutrals, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 495, 538 (2010). 
 34. See, e.g., Christopher J. Karacic & Howard S. Suskin, When the Arbi-
tration Forum Is Unavailable: What Happens Next?, ALTERNATIVE DISP. 
RESOL., Winter 2014, at 2, 5 (“Ultimately, the Supreme Court may be called 
upon to resolve the split among the circuits . . . . The issue is particularly sali-
ent because the NAF—a once-popular and oft-chosen arbitration forum—has 
become unavailable for all consumer arbitrations.”); William A. Schreiner, Jr., 
Is an Arbitration Agreement Valid if the Designated Arbitrator Is Unavaila-
ble??, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
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One might assume that the NAF’s impact on creating ex-
clusive arbitration disputes is over, now that it has been nearly 
six years since the NAF stopped accepting consumer arbitra-
tions. However, that assumption would be incorrect. It is un-
clear how many people have active contracts designating the 
NAF as the exclusive arbitration forum, but Swanson’s com-
plaint noted that MBNA/Bank of America, JP MorganChase, 
Citigroup, Discover Card, Deutsche Financial, and American 
Express were, at the time, processing claims in the NAF under 
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.
35
 If large credit card 
companies like these designated the NAF as an exclusive arbi-
tration forum, one can only imagine how many smaller compa-
nies did the same. Thus, although these large, sophisticated 
companies have likely updated their contracts with their con-
sumers to write out the NAF as the exclusive arbitration fo-
rum,
36
 it is unlikely that all of these smaller, less sophisticated 
companies have done the same. This is not mere conjecture; af-
ter conducting a brief online search, this author found a num-
ber, and variety, of companies that still list the NAF as the ex-
clusive arbitration forum under the Terms and Conditions 
found on their websites—websites that have been updated 
since July 2009.
37
 Therefore, while the numbers may be uncer-
tain, it is clear a large number of active contracts exist that still 
 
detail.aspx?g=3b8fd87e-cf63-4655-9c06-ce2c650570c2 (discussing a Virginia 
Supreme Court ruling on this issue). 
 35. Complaint at 5, Swanson v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc. (July 14, 
2009) (No. 27CV0918550), 2009 WL 2029918. 
 36. For example, in new contracts with customers, Discover Card and 
American Express both designate the American Arbitration Association or 
JAMS as the exclusive arbitration forum. Cardmember Agreement: Part 2 of 2, 
AM. EXPRESS 1, 5 (Dec. 31, 2014), http://web.aexp-static.com/us/content/ 
pdf/cardmember-agreements/green/AmericanExpressGreenCard.pdf; Interac-
tive Guide: Arbitration, DISCOVER, http://www.discover.com/credit 
-cards/cardmember-agreement/arbitration.html (last updated Dec. 31, 2014). 
 37. See Terms and Conditions, DYNAVOX, http://www.dynavoxtech.com/ 
terms-and-conditions (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (belonging to a tablet and app 
company with a website copyright of 2014); Terms and Conditions, 
LEADERSHIP INST. LAS VEGAS, http://www.leadlv.com/terms-and-conditions 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (belonging to a leadership program, sponsored by the 
Las Vegas Metro Chamber of Commerce, with a website copyright of 2015); 
Terms & Conditions, MYPAYDAYCASHADVANCELOANS.COM, http:// 
mypaydaycashadvanceloans.com/terms-and-conditions.aspx (last visited Apr. 
3, 2015) (belonging to a loan company with a website copyright of 2012); Terms 
& Conditions / Privacy Policy, FIX IT TODAY, http://www 
.fixittoday.com/tcp.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (belonging to an auto repair 
company with a website copyright of 2015); Terms of Use, RENOVATION READY, 
http://www.renovationready.com/about/terms-of-use (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) 
(belonging to a home remodeling loan company with a website copyright of 
2014). 
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list the NAF as the exclusive arbitration forum. Therefore, po-
tentially hundreds of lawsuits could still arise over the NAF be-
ing unavailable to arbitrate. Indeed, a number of court deci-
sions have even involved contracts that designated the NAF as 
the exclusive arbitration forum and were signed by the parties 
after July 2009, including Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 
LLC.
38
 
Additionally, contracts involving the NAF do not have a 
monopoly over this issue; some of the recent cases involving ex-
clusive arbitration forum disputes have arisen over forums 
completely separate from the NAF.
39
 And even if the NAF’s ef-
fect on the rising number of exclusive arbitration forum dis-
putes peters out, what happened with the NAF could happen 
again. For example, “[v]ery often parties designate the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA) as the forum in which dis-
putes will be heard and determined, and specify AAA rules for 
commercial and other types of disputes to control the process.”
40
 
Thus, the same thing would happen if the AAA were to stop ac-
cepting consumer arbitrations like the NAF, which is not en-
tirely implausible since the AAA has been accused of fraudu-
lent activities in the past
41
 and issued a moratorium on 
commercial arbitration for a period around the time Swanson 
filed her complaint against the NAF.
42
 Therefore, it is unlikely 
that this issue will become obsolete any time soon.  
In sum, there are a number of reasons why a forum might 
 
 38. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788–89 (7th Cir. 
2013) (signed May 8, 2012); see, e.g., Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F. 
Supp. 2d 60, 66–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (signed March 9, 2011); Meskill v. GGNSC 
Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (D. Minn. 2012) (signed Sep-
tember 9, 2009); Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398, 
401 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (signed June 3, 2010). 
 39. See, e.g., Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 
2014) (involving the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation as the designated 
arbitration forum). 
 40. Robert N. Rapp & Alexander B. Reich, AAA Shakes Up ADR with New 
Rules To Permit Appeals of Arbitration Awards, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1d466bd0-aeff-43e5-96b9 
-def338ff7baf; see, e.g., Terms and Conditions, STUDENT LOAN COALITION, 
http://www.studentloancoalition.com/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=6&Itemid=104 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 41. See Pam Martens, How Citigroup Stays Fraud-Proof, SALON (Sept. 8, 
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/09/08/how_citigroup_stays_fraud_proof. 
 42. Mark Cohen, Minnesota AG To Testify in D.C. Today; AAA Puts Mora-
torium on Consumer Debt Cases, MINN. LAW. (July 22, 2009), http:// 
minnlawyer.com/2009/07/22/minnesota-ag-to-testify-in-d-c-today-aaa-puts 
-moratorium-on-consumer-debt-cases. 
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refuse to hear a party’s dispute.
43
 However, the fact that the 
NAF is no longer accepting arbitrations has been by far the 
most common reason within the last five years, and it appears 
to be the reason why the number of these disputes has been on 
the rise. Although it is unclear how many contracts exist with, 
or how many lawsuits are filed over, exclusive arbitration fo-
rum agreements, one can surmise that this will continue to be 
an active issue in the coming years. Nevertheless, while a fo-
rum’s refusal may be why the parties are fighting, issues also 
arise once they bring their dispute to court. 
B. THE APPROACHES COURTS TAKE WHEN DECIDING WHETHER 
TO ARBITRATE OR ADJUDICATE AN EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION 
FORUM DISPUTE 
Generally, courts face two types of interpretation issues 
when deciding whether to send parties with an exclusive arbi-
tration forum clause to arbitration or to adjudicate their dis-
pute. First, courts must use contract law to interpret the par-
ties’ contract and its arbitration clause,
44
 and contract law 
varies from state to state.
45
 Second, courts face issues of statu-
tory interpretation because their ability to appoint a new arbi-
trator arises from statute.
46
 Though some state courts have as-
sumed this power from state statute,
47
 most state courts and all 
federal courts gain authority from the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) to appoint a new arbitrator.
48
 Specifically, 9 U.S.C. § 5 
states: 
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or ap-
pointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall 
be followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be 
provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such 
method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming 
 
 43. See supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. 
Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“An arbitration provision, like any other 
binding agreement between parties, is a creature of contract, and therefore a 
party can be compelled to arbitrate only to the extent he has so agreed.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 45. Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?: An Argument for 
Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 95, 116 (2006) 
(“[T]he rules governing contract enforcement vary from state to state . . . .”). 
 46. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792–93 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (using 9 U.S.C. § 5 to appoint a new arbitrator); Khan v. Dell Inc., 
669 F.3d 350, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2012) (same). 
 47. See, e.g., New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern ex rel. 
Petscher, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (using the Florida 
Arbitration Code to appoint a new arbitrator). 
 48. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
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of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then 
upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall 
designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the 
case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the 
same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named 
therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitra-
tion shall be by a single arbitrator.
49
 
 Although courts use contract and statutory law when try-
ing to resolve this issue, they vary widely in how they apply 
them.
50
 This Section discusses the three general approaches 
that courts have used in determining whether to litigate a case 
or send it to arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 5. 
1. Approach #1: The Integral-Ancillary Test 
The vast majority of courts use the “Integral-Ancillary 
Test” when determining how to treat an exclusive arbitration 
forum clause under 9 U.S.C. § 5.
51
 This test originates from 
Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
52
 but 
Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. provides the most cit-
ed form of the test
53
: 
Where the chosen forum is unavailable . . . or has failed for some rea-
son, [9 U.S.C.] § 5 applies and a substitute arbitrator may be named. 
Only if the choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to ar-
bitrate, rather than an “ancillary logistical concern” will the failure of 
the chosen forum preclude arbitration.
54
 
Even though this test is the majority rule, courts apply it 
differently. Courts generally accept that rules of contract inter-
pretation decide whether the choice of forum is integral or not.
55
 
However, some courts only look to the plain language of the 
 
 49. Id. (emphasis added). 
 50. See Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 438–
39 (S.C. 2009). 
 51. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 567 (W. Va. 2013) 
(“This [integral-ancillary] formulation of the application of section 5 of the 
FAA is the majority rule.”). 
 52. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 
1359, 1364–66 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 53. See Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2013) (“The integral term vs. ancillary logistical concern test articulated by 
Brown has been adopted by the large majority of jurisdictions . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 54. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 
2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Zechman, 742 F. Supp. at 1364). 
 55. See Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No. 10-cv-
1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011) (“To determine 
whether selection of a specific arbitrator is integral to the entire agreement, 
courts refer to general principles of contract interpretation.”). 
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contract in making the integral-ancillary determination.
56
 Oth-
er courts emphasize that a choice of forum cannot be integral 
without a showing that it was integral to the parties when they 
entered into the contract via external evidence.
57
 Still other 
courts examine a combination of contractual plain language 
and other, external evidence, such as party testimony.
58
 
As for the plain language of the contract, some courts rely 
heavily on whether the contract contains an “express state-
ment” designating a particular arbitration forum as exclusive.
59
 
Others find that an implied statement of exclusivity is enough 
to make the forum integral.
60
 As for external evidence, a num-
ber of courts examine the forum’s rules or code of procedures 
when deciding if the forum is integral,
61
 but other courts hold 
that a forum’s rules and procedures have no effect on whether 
the forum is integral.
62
 Altogether, while the Integral-Ancillary 
Test may be the majority rule, courts vary widely in how they 
apply it. 
 
 56. See, e.g., id. (noting that the court only needs to look to the terms of 
the agreement to determine the parties’ intent); Branch v. Sickert, No. 2:10-
CV-128-RWS, 2011 WL 796783, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2011) (looking only to 
the terms of the contract in deciding whether the choice of forum was inte-
gral). 
 57. See, e.g., Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 966, 
975 (D. Minn. 2012) (noting, first, that the plaintiff offered no evidence that 
designating the NAF as the arbitration forum was important to either party 
when entering into the contract); New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. 
Stern ex rel. Petscher, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same). 
 58. See, e.g., Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167–68 
(D.S.D. 2010) (looking to the language of the contract and to the testimony of 
the plaintiff). 
 59. See, e.g., Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“We see no evidence that the choice was integral here—in fact, there was not 
even an express statement that the NASD would be the arbitrator.”), abrogat-
ed on other grounds by Atl. Nat’l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 
931 (9th Cir. 2010); Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195, 
1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“At a minimum, for the selection of an arbitrator to 
be ‘integral’, the arbitration clause must include an express statement desig-
nating a specific arbitrator.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398, 
406 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (“Even without the express use of the term ‘exclusive-
ly,’ the Indiana Supreme Court found the . . . provision integral to the agree-
ment . . . .”). 
 61. See, e.g., Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 686 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2013) (taking into account the fact that NAF’s Code of Procedure states 
that only the NAF may apply it). 
 62. See, e.g., Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶ 19, 808 
N.W.2d 114, 120 (finding of “little significance” the fact that the NAF rules 
state that only the NAF may apply them). 
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2. Approach #2: The Exclusivity Test 
A few other courts have followed a second approach, here 
termed the “Exclusivity Test.” Instead of debating the im-
portance, or integrality, of the arbitration forum, the court 
simply focuses on whether the contract specifies that arbitra-
tion can only be conducted by a single arbitration forum.
63
 If it 
does, the court holds that it must adjudicate the dispute.
64
 If it 
does not, the court holds that it must submit the dispute to ar-
bitration.
65
 However, courts applying this test may interpret 
the same basic contract language differently. For example, 
when faced with contractual language specifying arbitration by 
the rules or procedures of a particular forum, the Second Cir-
cuit decided the forum was exclusive and the Seventh Circuit 
decided it was not.
66
 
3. Approach #3: Arbitration Bias 
Finally, a couple of early courts faced with exclusive arbi-
tration forum disputes simply opted to submit the case to arbi-
tration.
67
 These courts appear to have assumed that if the par-
ties agreed to arbitration, arbitrating was their intent and the 
forum was secondary.
68
 This Note will not discuss this approach 
further, as it was only followed by a few courts that faced this 
issue over thirty years ago.
69
 
 
 63. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 789–91 
(7th Cir. 2013) (looking at whether the language of the contract exclusively 
designates an arbitration forum).  
 64. See In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 561 
(2d Cir. 1995) (holding 9 U.S.C. § 5 inapplicable because the court had read 
the contract as designating arbitration before only the New York Stock Ex-
change). 
 65. See Green, 724 F.3d at 789–91, 793 (holding that, because the court 
had interpreted the contract to contain just an arbitration clause, it could use 
9 U.S.C. § 5 to appoint a new arbitrator). 
 66. Compare id. at 788–91 (finding an agreement to resolve all disputes 
under the Code of Procedure of the NAF did not name the forum as the exclu-
sive arbitrator), with Salomon, 68 F.3d at 557 (finding an agreement to arbi-
trate disputes according to the NYSE Constitution and rules named the NYSE 
as the exclusive arbitrator). 
 67. See Astra Footwear Indus. v. Harwyn Int’l, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 907, 
908, 910–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 578 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1978); Delma Eng’g 
Corp. v. K & L Constr. Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (App. Div. 1958). 
 68. See Delma Eng’g Corp., 174 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (holding that, even 
though the agreement provided for arbitration “in accordance with the rules of 
the New York Building Congress, Inc.,” the “dominant intent” of the parties 
was simply to arbitrate).  
 69. See, e.g., Astra Footwear, 442 F. Supp. 907. 
2015] EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES 2017 
 
Overall, most courts follow the Integral-Ancillary Test,
70
 
though a few courts (the Second and Seventh Circuits in par-
ticular) have used the Exclusivity Test.
71
 As may be surmised 
from this discussion, however, there is significant disparity in 
how courts apply these tests. Much of this disparity arises from 
differences in how courts interpret contractual language and 
the FAA, which will be discussed in Part II. 
C. HOW ARBITRATION CAN AFFECT A CASE 
Of course, the exclusive arbitration forum dispute only 
matters if arbitration actually unfairly affects the course of a 
case. The fact that contentions over exclusive arbitration forum 
agreements arise indicates that arbitration must be less desir-
able than litigation to at least some parties, like Joyce Green.
72
 
However, critics vary on whether arbitration is actually unfair 
and whether it affects the outcome of a case.
73
 
Many supporters of arbitration argue that the costs of arbi-
tration are lower than the costs of litigation.
74
 These lower 
costs, they contend, make arbitration forums more accessible 
than the court system.
75
 Moreover, supporters of arbitration of-
ten point to the fact that studies comparing arbitration and lit-
igation are largely inconclusive and therefore argue that there 
is no evidence that plaintiffs fare worse in arbitration.
76
 
On the other hand, the arbitration system has many crit-
ics, and some directly challenge the merits of the arbitration 
system that its advocates put forth. Mark Budnitz argues that 
“[a]n examination of the fees charged by arbitration service 
 
 70. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 567 (W. Va. 2013); 
see, e.g., supra notes 51–62. 
 71. See, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 789–91, 793; Salomon, 68 F.3d at 561. 
 72. See Green, 724 F.3d at 788–89; supra notes 11–13 and accompanying 
text. 
 73. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1249–53 (2009) (discussing some of the arguments 
over whether arbitration is fair). 
 74. See Steven C. Bennett & Dean A. Calloway, A Closer Look at the Rag-
ing Consumer Arbitration Debate, DISP. RESOL. J., May/Oct. 2010, at 28, 31 
(“As a general proposition, arbitration is quicker and cheaper than traditional 
litigation.”); accord Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in 
the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 561 (2001). 
 75. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better 
Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 791 (2008) (“One study conclud-
ed that litigation is not a plausible option for employees below around the 
$60,000 income level, but arbitration is a realistic alternative.”). 
 76. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1259. 
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providers demonstrates that the costs are often so high con-
sumers are denied access to arbitration and, therefore, to any 
dispute-resolution forum.”
77
 Budnitz goes on to examine the 
costs of using various arbitration forums and how they can be 
prohibitive for a party.
78
 
David Schwartz argues that studies examining whether 
arbitration affects the ultimate outcome of the case have gen-
erally used flawed methodology.
79
 After reinterpreting the data 
of a well-known arbitration versus litigation study, Schwartz 
notes that the results seem to be pro-defendant.
80
 He also ar-
gues that while defendants are likely to prefer arbitration, 
plaintiffs usually only prefer arbitration for low stakes claims.
81
 
For high-cost/high-stakes claims, plaintiffs prefer the court sys-
tem because the arbitration evidentiary and discovery systems 
make it more difficult for the plaintiff to meet his or her burden 
of proof.
82
 
Other critics of the arbitration system question the ac-
countability and transparency of arbitration; arbitration 
awards are subject to limited review, and arbitrators generally 
do not need to articulate reasons for their decisions.
83
 Addition-
ally, U.S. citizens expect a “day in court,” and arbitration de-
prives parties of that, often to the disappointment of the non-
sophisticated party.
84
 Therefore, while the proponents of arbi-
 
 77. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 135 (2004). 
 78. Id. at 136–44. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration 
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 754–56 (arguing that arbitration costs are 
very likely not prohibitive). 
 79. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1284–97. 
 80. See id. at 1297–1308. 
 81. See id. at 1269–74; cf. Drahozal, supra note 78, at 749–50 (arguing 
that enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements is not unfair because the 
individual has agreed to give up the right to adjudicate rare, high-dollar 
claims in exchange for the ability to arbitrate more common, low-dollar 
claims). 
 82. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1274–77. But see Drahozal, supra note 
78, at 752–53 (arguing that arbitration can be beneficial to an individual be-
cause it can limit costly discovery). 
 83. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Prob-
lem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 300–01 (2004). But see 
Drahozal, supra note 78, at 753 (contending that giving up the right to appeal 
in exchange for arbitration may be advantageous for parties because it saves 
in costs and often corrections on appeal are for lawmaking purposes); cf. Dan-
iel R. Strader, Bridging the Gap: Amending the Federal Arbitration Act To Al-
low Discovery of Nonparties, 41 STETSON L. REV. 909, 933–34 (2012) (arguing 
that, because arbitration results are final, awards are disbursed more quickly, 
thereby benefitting parties). 
 84. See Reuben, supra note 83, at 310 (“Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
2015] EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES 2019 
 
tration argue otherwise, its critics articulate a number of ways 
in which the arbitration system can unfairly affect a case. 
Thus, a party facing an exclusive arbitration forum dispute 
may have a legitimate concern in wanting to keep the case in 
litigation, rather than letting the court remand it to arbitra-
tion. 
II. THE COURTS’ PROBLEMATIC TREATMENT OF 
EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES  
As Part I discussed, courts take different approaches when 
interpreting the same contractual language and FAA statutory 
provision.
85
 These different approaches create problems for par-
ties by making it difficult for them to predict how a court will 
interpret a contract with an exclusive arbitration forum clause. 
As such, Section A discusses some of the issues with how courts 
have interpreted exclusive arbitration forum agreements. 
Moreover, these approaches may be inconsistent with the FAA, 
which is discussed in Section B.  
A. ISSUES WITH THE WAYS COURTS INTERPRET EXCLUSIVE 
ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES 
Multiple issues exist with regard to how courts have decid-
ed to interpret contracts with exclusive arbitration forum 
clauses. Subsection 1 illustrates the contradictory ways courts 
have interpreted the same basic contractual language of exclu-
sive arbitration forum agreements. Subsection 2 examines the 
courts’ infrequent use of external evidence when deciding ex-
clusive arbitration agreements and why that is problematic. 
Finally, Subsection 3 discusses how most contracts with an ex-
clusive arbitration forum clause are contracts of adhesion and 
how the courts consider (or neglect to consider) this fact when 
deciding disputes arising under them. 
1. Contradictions in How Courts Interpret the Contractual 
Language of Exclusive Arbitration Forum Agreements 
It is well-known that principles of contract interpretation 
vary from state to state.
86
 This fact is demonstrated by the pre-
ceding discussion of exclusive arbitration forum disputes, as 
courts take widely different approaches when interpreting ex-
 
many are shocked and dismayed when they learn that they no longer have 
that right [to a day in court] because of an arbitration clause buried in the fine 
print.”). 
 85. See supra Part I.B. 
 86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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clusive arbitration forum agreements.
87
 Doing so is within the 
courts’ prerogatives; however, one troublesome issue lies in the 
fact that courts have interpreted the exact same, or at least 
substantially similar, contractual language differently. To illus-
trate this point, this Subsection discusses how courts have read 
two common examples of contractual language establishing an 
exclusive arbitration forum agreement. 
a. “In Accordance with the Procedures of an Arbitration 
Forum” 
A large number of contracts contain language specifying 
that arbitration will be conducted in accordance with a specific 
arbitration forum’s rules or code of procedure.
88
 Courts using 
the Integral-Ancillary Test
89
 have held both ways when apply-
ing the test to this language. Some courts have found that this 
language indicating the procedure of a particular forum there-
by makes the forum integral to the parties’ agreement and 
that, since the forum is unavailable for arbitration, the court 
should litigate the case. Other courts, instead emphasizing the 
overarching agreement to arbitrate, have found that this same 
basic language does not make the forum integral to the agree-
ment and that the court should thus remand the case to arbi-
 
 87. See supra Part I.B. 
 88. A number of variations of this language exist, but they all specify the 
same basic contractual language. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., 
LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) (“All disputes . . . shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of 
the National Arbitration Forum.”); Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App’x 174, 175 
(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“You and we agree that any and all claims, dis-
putes, or controversies . . . shall be resolved by binding individual (and not 
class) arbitration by and under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitra-
tion Forum.”); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (“The Agreement contains an arbitration clause which provides that 
ITT and the employee ‘agree that any dispute between them . . . shall be re-
solved by binding arbitration under the Code of Procedure of the National Ar-
bitration Forum.’ ”); Branch v. Sickert, No. 2:10-CV-128-RWS, 2011 WL 
796783, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2011) (“[A]ny controversy . . . shall be settled 
by arbitration . . . in accordance with the rules of the Board of Governors of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers then in effect 
 . . . .”); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2013) (“[A]ll claims . . . shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration . . . 
in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure . . . .”); 
Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) 
(“[T]he agreement states that this binding arbitration shall be conducted ‘in 
accordance with [the NAF] Code of Procedure, which is hereby incorporated 
into this agreement.’ ” (alteration in original)). 
 89. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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tration.
90
  
Courts finding the forum to be integral based on just the 
contractual language have emphasized the repeated use of the 
forum’s name in the contract,
91
 that the contract used mandato-
ry language to indicate that the parties should use the forum’s 
rules or procedures,
92
 and that the parties designated one arbi-
trator throughout.
93
 Courts have often tied this latter point into 
an “express statement” discussion, which, as discussed above, 
courts have sometimes found indicative of a forum being inte-
gral to the agreement.
94
 In cases where the contract specifies 
the NAF’s Code of Procedure, courts have also stressed the fact 
that the NAF’s Code of Procedure states that only the NAF 
may administer it.
95
 
 
 90. Compare, e.g., Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 86 F. Supp. 
2d 966, 977 (D. Minn. 2012) (“[T]he Court concludes that even if Meskill were 
correct that the Arbitration Agreement mandated arbitration before the NAF, 
the forum’s unavailability simply results in a ‘lapse’ under 9 U.S.C. § 5 that 
the Court must remedy by appointing a substitute arbitrator.”), with Ranzy, 
393 F. App’x at 176 (“Thus, a federal court need not compel arbitration in a 
substitute forum if the designated forum becomes unavailable.”). 
 91. Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No. 10-cv-1390-
JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011) (“Defendant’s form 
arbitration agreement names the NAF specifically and exclusively throughout 
the agreement. . . . [T]hese provisions show that the parties intended to select 
the NAF as the exclusive arbitrator.”); Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 
2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 38, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (“The pervasive references 
to the NAF in the contract compel our conclusion that the parties intended for 
the NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator in any out-of-court dispute resolution.”). 
 92. See Miller, 746 S.E.2d at 686 (“The Arbitration Agreement’s use of the 
mandatory [language,] together with its express incorporation of the NAF 
Code, indicates that the parties . . . contracted to arbitrate only before the 
NAF.”); Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2011) (“The express designation of the NAF as the arbitration provid-
er in addition to the use of mandatory, as opposed to permissive, contractual 
language demonstrates that the parties intended that the NAF was integral to 
the arbitration agreement.”); Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 398, 259 
P.3d 803 (“Mandatory, as opposed to permissive, contractual language further 
demonstrates that a specifically named arbitration provider is integral to the 
agreement to arbitrate.”); cf. Ranzy, 393 F. App’x at 175 (emphasizing the fact 
that the contract used the term “shall”). 
 93. See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 32, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (“In 
this case, [the] contract names the NAF specifically and exclusively through-
out . . . .”). 
 94. See Geneva-Roth, 956 N.E.2d at 1202 (“At a minimum, for the selec-
tion of an arbitrator to be ‘integral’, the arbitration clause must include an ex-
press statement designating a specific arbitrator. An express designation of a 
single arbitration provider weighs in favor of a finding that the designated 
provider is integral to the agreement to arbitrate.” (citations omitted)); see also 
supra Part I.B.1. 
 95. NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE 1 (2008), available 
at http://www.adrforum.com/users/odr/resources/Employment/CODEof 
2022 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:2005 
 
Other courts have directly rejected these arguments, find-
ing the arbitration forum not integral based on the contractual 
language—even after considering party testimony. Several 
courts have held that the language “in accordance” with the 
NAF’s Code of Procedure is not strong enough to designate, ex-
plicitly, arbitration before the NAF
96
 (though one court suggest-
ed that “by and under the Code of Procedure of the [NAF]” 
would have been explicit enough to make the NAF integral to 
the agreement).
97
 Another court has held that, even though the 
NAF’s Code says only the NAF can administer it, it is of little 
significance.
98
 Moreover, a few courts have held the forum to be 
not integral simply because they found no evidence to the con-
trary, presumably based primarily on the court’s reading of the 
language of the contract itself.
99
 
 
Procedure2008.pdf (“This Code shall be administered only by the National Ar-
bitration Forum . . . .”); see, e.g., Klima, 2011 WL 5412216, at *4 (holding that 
the fact that the NAF’s Code of Procedure states that only the NAF may em-
ploy it “strengthens the Court’s finding that the parties exclusively selected 
the NAF”); Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 220 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2010) (emphasizing that the contract specified arbitration under the NAF 
Code, which says that only NAF members may apply it). 
 96. See Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 
969, 976 (D. Minn. 2012) (stating that the arbitration agreement, which stated 
that disputes must be resolved “in accordance” with the NAF Code of Proce-
dure, only implicitly designated arbitration before the NAF and therefore un-
dermines the idea that the NAF was integral to the agreement); Jones v. 
GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (D.S.D. 2010) (“In between 
those provisions [designating that disputes are to be resolved by arbitration 
and not by a court] is the language specifying resolution ‘in accordance with 
the National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure.’ The clause at issue does 
not mandate the NAF per se . . . .”). 
 97. Meskill, 862 F. Supp. at 969, 976 (holding that the arbitration clause 
before the court, which contained the phrase “in accordance with the [NAF] 
Code of Procedure,” did not include an express designation of an arbitration 
forum, distinguishing it from the arbitration clause before the Fifth Circuit in 
Ranzy, which contained the language “by and under the Code of Procedure of 
the [NAF]” and which, the court argued, more clearly mandated the NAF). 
 98. See Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶¶ 17–21, 808 
N.W.2d 114, 119–21 (“We conclude that designation of the NAF Code of Proce-
dure did not require an ‘NAF arbitrator’; a substitute arbitrator could apply 
common procedural rules like those found in the NAF Code of Procedure and 
public domain . . . .”). 
 99. See Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2006), 
(explaining only that the arbitration forum is not integral because there was 
no express statement that the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
(NASD) would be the arbitrator and no evidence that the NASD was central to 
the agreement), abrogated on other grounds by Atl. Nat’l Trust LLC v. Mt. 
Hawley Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2010); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. 
Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding only that “[h]ere there is 
no evidence that the choice of the NAF as the arbitration forum was an inte-
gral part of the agreement to arbitrate”). 
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The Second and Seventh Circuits are alone in using the 
Exclusivity Test approach,
100
 and both adopted this approach 
when faced with this contractual language.
101
 The Salomon 
court (Second Circuit) held that the contract’s language clearly 
designated arbitration “by the NYSE [New York Stock Ex-
change] and only the NYSE.”
102
 On the other hand, though the 
NAF’s Code of Procedure states that only the NAF can apply it, 
the Green court (Seventh Circuit) held that, as other arbitra-
tion forums could still technically use the NAF’s Code of Proce-
dure, the agreement was not exclusive.
103
 
What a court may accept as a valid argument when faced 
with “under the procedure of” contractual language in an arbi-
tration agreement is largely ambiguous. However, this phrase 
does not hold a monopoly on ambiguity in exclusive arbitration 
forum clauses. 
b. “Shall Be Resolved by Arbitration Administered by a 
Particular Arbitration Forum” 
Another type of contract that has come before the courts 
specifies that any disputes between the parties shall be re-
solved by arbitration administered by a particular arbitration 
forum.
104
 Although this language seems arguably clearer than 
 
 100. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 101. Compare Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 788 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (“All disputes, claims or controversies . . . shall be resolved by bind-
ing arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of the 
National Arbitration Forum.”), with In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative 
Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he defendants . . . had signed an 
agreement to arbitrate (under the Constitution and rules of the NYSE) any 
dispute arising out of their employment by [the plaintiff].”). 
 102. Salomon, 68 F.3d at 557. 
 103. See Green, 724 F.3d at 789–90; supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 104. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 351 (3d Cir. 2012) (“ANY 
CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR CONTROVERSY . . . SHALL BE RESOLVED 
EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION 
ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM (NAF) under 
its Code of Procedure then in effect . . . .”); Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-
1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009) (“The arbitra-
tion clause provides that any claims related to the Agreement shall be re-
solved by binding arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum 
(‘NAF’).”); New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern ex rel. Petscher, 14 
So. 3d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“The agreement provided . . . that 
any disputes would be submitted to arbitration to be administered by the 
American Arbitration Association (the AAA).”); Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 
N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ill. 2011) (“You agree that any Dispute between You and 
Gateway will be resolved exclusively and finally by arbitration administered 
by the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) and conducted under its rules 
 . . . .”); Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 436–37 
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the language discussed in the previous section, courts have still 
split in their interpretations.
105
 Courts considering this contrac-
tual language have generally been ones following the Integral-
Ancillary approach. Courts that have upheld the forum as inte-
gral to the agreement under this language have emphasized 
that the contract clearly sets out the forum as the arbitrator.
106
 
On the other hand, at least one court has held that this lan-
guage by itself is not enough to make the forum integral.
107
 Yet 
another court faced with this language held the forum to be not 
integral because the parties did not present external evidence 
showing that it was.
108
 
At least two courts have explicitly found this type of lan-
guage ambiguous. In both cases, Dell, Inc. was the defendant, 
and the contractual language of the arbitration clause specifi-
cally stated that disputes “shall be resolved exclusively and fi-
nally by binding arbitration administered by the National Arbi-
tration Forum.”
109
 The two courts decided that “exclusively” 
could modify either “binding arbitration” or “administered by 
the National Arbitration Forum.”
110
 Ultimately, both courts 
held that the identity of the forum was not integral to the 
agreement because federal policy supports arbitration.
111
 How-
 
(S.C. 2009) (“Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, any action, dispute, 
claim, or controversy . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration administered 
by the National Health Lawyers Association (the ‘NHLA’).”). 
 105. Compare, e.g., Khan, 669 F.3d at 357 (“The contract’s language does 
not indicate the parties’ unambiguous intent not to arbitrate their disputes if 
NAF is unavailable.”), with Carideo, 2009 WL 3485933, at *6 (“[S]election of 
NAF is integral to the arbitration clause . . . . To appoint a substitute arbitra-
tor would constitute a wholesale revision of the arbitration clause.”). 
 106. See Carideo, 2009 WL 3485933, at *4 (“This language clearly and une-
quivocally selects NAF as the arbitrator, specifies that NAF will apply its own 
rules in the arbitration, and does not provide for an alternative arbitral fo-
rum.”); cf. Grant, 678 S.E.2d at 437, 439 (holding the forum integral because 
the contract mandated “arbitration administered by the National Health Law-
yers Association” (now the “AHLA”) and the AHLA has specific rules that the 
court felt reflected the parties’ intent to “arbitrate exclusively before that 
body”). 
 107. Carr, 944 N.E.2d at 335 (“[T]he mere fact parties name an arbitral 
service to handle arbitrations and specify rules to be applied does not, stand-
ing alone, make that designation integral to the agreement.”). 
 108. See New Port Richey, 14 So. 3d at 1087 (holding the forum not integral 
because the appellee did not present evidence to the circuit court showing that 
the designation of the AAA was integral to the agreement to arbitrate). 
 109. Khan, 669 F.3d at 351 (changed from all capitals); Adler v. Dell Inc., 
No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) (same). 
 110. See Khan, 669 F.3d at 354–55; Adler, 2009 WL 4580739, at *2. 
 111. See Khan, 669 F.3d at 356–57 (“Although courts are divided on the 
issue, we conclude that the ‘liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration’ coun-
sels us to favor the [pro-arbitration] line of cases.”); Adler, 2009 WL 4580739, 
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ever, yet another court faced with the same contractual lan-
guage, and with Dell as the defendant, found that the language 
unambiguously supports the NAF as the exclusive forum.
112
 
Moreover, in these same Dell cases, the court finding for 
the plaintiff found the forum integral partially because the con-
tract specified that the NAF would apply its own rules in the 
arbitration, and partially because the contract did not provide 
for an alternate forum.
113
 Yet, one of the courts finding for Dell 
found the contractual language ambiguous for these same rea-
sons.
114
 
Thus, the ways in which courts have at times interpreted 
the same basic contractual language are contradictory. This 
has the unfortunate effect of making it difficult for parties to 
predict how a court will rule on their exclusive arbitration fo-
rum contract, particularly when they are before a court that 
has not interpreted that specific contractual language at issue 
in the parties’ dispute. The disparate holdings discussed in this 
Subsection may be more understandable in situations in which 
the court took party testimony into account when reaching the 
decision; in those cases, it would seem that the different rulings 
are because of the parties’ different situations.
115
 However, 
many of these contradictory decisions are from courts looking 
 
at *4 (“[T]he Sixth Circuit [has] stated that any doubts regarding arbitrability 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”). 
 112. See Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 113. See id. at *4–5 (“This language clearly and unequivocally selects NAF 
as the arbitrator, specifies that NAF will apply its own rules in the arbitra-
tion, and does not provide for an alternative arbitral forum.”). 
 114. See Adler, 2009 WL 4580739, at *3 (“[T]he agreement requires NAF 
rules be used. This would appear to be mere surplusage, except in the case of a 
substitute arbitration forum . . . . Further, the agreement lacks any provision 
for a course of conduct in the event that NAF is unavailable or unwilling to 
arbitrate disputes between the parties. The lack of an alternative to NAF in 
the agreement may be taken as indicating a primary intent to arbitrate all 
disputes, or on the other hand, that the parties contemplated arbitration only 
if administered by NAF.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 
966, 975 (D. Minn. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff offered no evidence that the 
designation of the NAF was important to him or the defendant); Jones v. 
GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (D.S.D. 2010) (holding that, 
due in part to the plaintiff’s testimony, simply specifying the NAF rules in the 
parties’ agreement did not mean that the NAF was integral to the agreement); 
Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶ 25, 808 N.W.2d 114, 122 (not-
ing that the NAF Code could not have been integral to the parties’ agreement 
because the plaintiff did not raise the unavailability of the NAF Code as a de-
fense—the circuit court did sua sponte).  
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solely at the plain contractual language.
116
 Indeed, many courts 
have neglected to look at external evidence altogether when de-
ciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes. 
2. Courts Often Do Not Use Parol Evidence in Deciding 
Exclusive Arbitration Forum Disputes 
Parol evidence is evidence that is external to the plain lan-
guage of the contract, and courts may use parol evidence to in-
terpret an ambiguous contract.
117
 As indicated, courts often try 
to ascertain the parties’ intentions at the time they agreed to 
the arbitration clause from the plain language of the contract 
alone.
118
 However, though courts may not acknowledge it, it ap-
pears that this approach often yields little more than 
judicialized guesswork. 
For example, in Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonburg, L.P., the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed how there is compa-
rable authority that supports litigating and that supports arbi-
trating an exclusive arbitration forum dispute.
119
 The court pro-
ceeded to compare the facts before it to the facts of a case 
recently before a federal court in South Dakota, finding them to 
be very similar.
120
 However, the Superior Court rejected the 
 
 116. See, e.g., Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No. 
10-cv-1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011) (“Here, 
the terms of the arbitration agreement are clear, and the Court need not look 
outside the written agreement to ascertain the parties’ intent.”); Stewart v. 
GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“[T]his Court 
will not rewrite an arbitration agreement . . . . Sanctioning this type of action 
would run contrary to the clear intent of the parties as expressed by the plain 
language of the Agreement itself.”). 
 117. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, The Parol Evidence Rule and 
Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence To Establish and Clarify Ambiguity in 
Written Contract, 40 A.L.R.3D 1384, 1389 (1971) (“[T]here seems to be a . . . 
wider recognition of the principle that extrinsic evidence can be introduced to 
clarify an ambiguity . . . .”). 
 118. See, e.g., Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011 
WL 5827208, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2011) (“The plain language of the 
agreement shows that the parties’ primary and overriding concern was that 
claims in excess of $15,000 be submitted to arbitration, not that they be arbi-
trated by the NAF.”); Stewart, 9 A.3d at 221 (“[T]his Court will not . . . insert 
additional terms . . . . Sanctioning this type of action would run contrary to the 
clear intent of the parties as expressed by the plain language of the Agreement 
itself.”); see also supra notes 59–62, 91–95 and accompanying text. But see, 
e.g., Jones, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (holding that the plaintiff’s testimony sup-
ported a finding that the forum was not integral because she testified that 
“she did not negotiate the Arbitration Agreement, did not remember the Arbi-
tration Agreement itself, but did not doubt that she signed the document”). 
 119. Stewart, 9 A.3d at 219–20. 
 120. Id. at 220–21. 
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federal court’s legal analysis because it concluded that the par-
ties expressly agreed to several terms that, it felt, the federal 
court had not fully considered.
121
 Yet, in doing so, the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania only examined the plain language of the 
contract.
122
 If the Superior Court had considered parol evidence, 
the contradictory rulings between the two courts might have 
been reconcilable because the Superior Court’s disparate hold-
ing would have been based on the parties’ different circum-
stances between the two cases. Instead, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania summed up the stance of most courts, which ne-
glect to examine parol evidence: “[T]his Court will not . . . insert 
additional terms [into the parties’ agreement]. . . . Sanctioning 
this type of action would run contrary to the clear intent of the 
parties as expressed by the plain language of the Agreement 
itself.”
123
 
Of course, there is an impediment to courts using parol ev-
idence: the parol evidence rule. The convoluted parol evidence 
rule is not capable of being definitively stated,
124
 but one aspect 
of the rule is relevant to this discussion. Courts generally agree 
that parol evidence can be used to interpret ambiguous contrac-
tual language.
125
 However, conservative courts will only admit 
external evidence to interpret a contract if it is ambiguous on 
its face.
126
 Other, more liberal courts will admit external evi-
dence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous, and then 
allow parol evidence if the court determines that the contract is 
ambiguous.
127
 For the conservative courts, then, the parol evi-
dence rule may block the admissibility of all external evidence 
in an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. If a conservative 
court decides that the language is unambiguous on its face, it 
will only consider the plain language of the contract.
128
 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 219–20. 
 123. Id. at 221. 
 124. See Ralph James Mooney, A Friendly Letter to the Oregon Supreme 
Court: Let’s Try Again on the Parol Evidence Rule, 84 OR. L. REV. 369, 372 
(2005). 
 125. Leonard Marinaccio, III, Out on Parol?: A Critical Examination of the 
Alaska Supreme Court’s Application of the Parol Evidence Rule, 11 ALASKA L. 
REV. 405, 407 (1994) (“All courts agree that where such language is vague or 
ambiguous, the parol evidence rule permits evidence of surrounding circum-
stances to be introduced . . . to resolve any ambiguity.”). 
 126. See 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33:42 (4th ed. 
2012). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. (“Generally, the language is to be viewed as a reasonable per-
son, under the circumstances, would view it . . . .”). 
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Yet, even for these conservative courts, parol evidence 
should be admissible for most exclusive arbitration forum 
clauses. There has been controversy over the meaning of a 
clause stating that the parties agree to resolve disputes 
through binding arbitration administered by a particular fo-
rum,
129
 and that clause is arguably more straightforward than 
many exclusive arbitration forum clauses. Courts should note 
that if other jurisdictions have reached such varied interpreta-
tions of this arguably straightforward language, there is likely 
enough ambiguity on the face of most exclusive arbitration fo-
rum clauses to admit parol evidence. 
In sum, because courts often do not use parol evidence 
when deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes even 
though they very likely could, they often resort to guesswork, 
which undermines contractual predictability for parties. This 
problem is even more disconcerting when one considers that 
most of the contracts involving an exclusive arbitration forum 
clause are contracts of adhesion. 
3. Most Exclusive Arbitration Forum Agreements Are 
Contracts of Adhesion 
In a contract of adhesion, the “accepting party” must agree 
to the terms of the “drafting party’s” contract on a “take-it-or-
leave-it” basis.
130
 Contracts of adhesion are very common, rang-
ing from insurance policies to credit card agreements.
131
 With a 
contract of adhesion, the accepting party has no meaningful 
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement,
132
 typically 
 
 129. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 130. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Prob-
lem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 346 (2011) (“A ‘contract of adhesion’ 
in the parlance of contract law, is a take-it-or-leave-it standard form agree-
ment, usually presented to a consumer by a business entity.”). But see Sandra 
F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitra-
tion Agreements 10 Years After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 249, 267 (2006), for a discussion of the higher definition some 
courts have placed on adhesion contracts. 
 131. See 25 DAVID K. DEWOLF, KELLER W. ALLEN, & DARLENE BARRIER 
CARUSO, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:19 
(3d ed. 2014), available at 25 WAPRAC 9:19 (Westlaw) (discussing common 
examples of contracts of adhesion); Susan Rabin & Christopher Q. Pham, Con-
tracts of Adhesion, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2006, at 11, 11 (“When people travel, rent 
cars, and purchase insurance, for example, they accept form contracts, which 
can be a normal . . . way of doing business.”). 
 132. Schwartz, supra note 130, at 346 (“Negotiation over any of the terms 
contained in the form—except, often, the price—is neither contemplated nor 
permitted.”). 
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is not represented by legal counsel,
133
 and often does not under-
stand, or even read, the entire agreement.
134
 And, unfortunate-
ly, but predictably, the vast majority of exclusive arbitration fo-
rum disputes arise from contracts of adhesion, with the 
accepting party bringing the dispute before the court.
135
 
Because these disputes are often over contracts of adhe-
sion, many of the fact patterns regarding the plaintiffs in these 
suits are quite sympathetic. Joyce Green is an example.
136
 Ge-
neva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards presents another exam-
ple.
137
 In Geneva-Roth, Akeala Edwards entered into a loan 
agreement that included an exclusive arbitration forum clause 
with LoanPoint USA for $300.
138
 However, every ten days 
LoanPoint USA implemented a finance charge against Ed-
wards, which resulted in over $700 of charges against her over 
ninety days.
139
 Edwards eventually filed a complaint against 
LoanPoint USA, asserting that the loan violated Indiana con-
sumer protection law.
140
  
These types of fact patterns are common and are not lim-
ited to the sphere of small loans. In Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwa-
ter Greeley LLC, the nursing facility Golden Living Center 
(GLC) admitted Howard Meskill, an eighty-three-year-old man, 
as a patient.
141
 At the time of admission, Meskill signed several 
agreements with GLC specifying the NAF as the exclusive arbi-
 
 133. Cf. New Eng. Eyecare of Waterbury, P.C. v. New Eng. Eyecare, P.C., 
No. 099465, 1991 WL 27919, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991) (stating 
that the contract before the court was not a contract of adhesion and noting 
that both parties were represented by attorneys in its writing). 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981) (“Cus-
tomers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard 
terms.”); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litiga-
tion: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 360 (“Sensible consum-
ers/investors do not read most of the contracts they sign, and sellers and issu-
ers know this so well that they often dispense with even showing the contract 
to the consumer/investor.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 794 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“The payday loan agreement that [the 
plaintiff] signed was certainly a contract of adhesion.”); Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 
F.3d 350, 351 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff agreed to the terms of 
the agreement by clicking a box on Dell’s website); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, 
LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 682–83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing how the plaintiff 
signed the contract as part of an admission packet to a nursing home). 
 136. See Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also supra 
notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 137. 956 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
 138. Id. at 1196–97. 
 139. Id. at 1197. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (D. Minn. 2012). 
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tral forum.
142
 Meskill fell down numerous times during the five 
months he lived at GLC.
143
 During his last fall, Meskill sus-
tained vertebral fractures and died three days later.
144
 Meskill’s 
son filed suit against GLC, asserting that his father’s falls were 
a result of the nursing facility’s negligence.
145
 Grant v. Magno-
lia Manor-Greenwood, Inc. presents similar facts.
146
 The Mag-
nolia Manor-Greenwood nursing home admitted Lessie Grant 
as a patient, with her admission contract designating the Na-
tional Health Lawyers Association as the exclusive arbitral fo-
rum.
147
 Grant fell while living at Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, 
sustaining a large hematoma above her left eye that she died 
from five days later.
148
 Her surviving husband sued the nursing 
home for survival, wrongful death, and loss of consortium.
149
 
Despite fact patterns that would presumably push courts 
to examine the circumstances surrounding the acceptance of 
these contracts, courts rarely seem to take the fact that the 
contract was a contract of adhesion into account when deciding 
an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. For example, in an ex-
clusive arbitration forum dispute, the testimony or record gen-
erally shows that the plaintiff(s) did not consider the indicated 
arbitration forum important when entering into the contract.
150
 
Courts then point to a plaintiff’s testimony or the record to 
support a decision that the parties simply agreed to arbitration, 
stating that this evidence shows that the plaintiff(s) did not 
consider the arbitration clause as “integral.”
151
 This might be 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 970. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. 678 S.E.2d 435 (S.C. 2009). 
 147. Id. at 436–37. 
 148. Id. at 437. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Selby v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., No. 12cv01562 AJB 
(BGS), 2013 WL 1315841, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“Plaintiff has not 
established, or even argued, that she would not have entered into the underly-
ing Agreement in the event of NAF’s unavailability to arbitrate the resulting 
disputes.”); Meskill, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (“[T]here is nothing in the record 
indicating that [the plaintiff] was even aware of the NAF (or its Code) when he 
signed the Arbitration Agreement.”); Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. 
Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (D.S.D. 2010) (“[The plaintiff] testified that she did not 
. . . remember the Arbitration Agreement itself, but did not doubt that she 
signed the document . . . .”); Ex parte Warren, 718 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. 1998) 
(“There is no evidence that [the plaintiff] or [the defendant] intended their 
choice of an arbitrator to be an essential term of the contract . . . .”).  
 151. See, e.g., Jones, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (“The testimony of Plaintiff 
Carol Jones further supports the conclusion that the NAF provision was not 
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valid when the courts are dealing with parties with equal bar-
gaining power.
152
 However, since most of the contracts involved 
in exclusive arbitration forum disputes are contracts of adhe-
sion, the party accepting the contract may not have even un-
derstood what the exclusive arbitration forum agreement 
meant—and even this presumes that the party read the con-
tract in its entirety, which most do not.
153
 Therefore, it is illogi-
cal for courts to make these kinds of assumptions about party 
testimony regarding contracts of adhesion. 
As these last three Subsections have shown, there is a 
large amount of disparity in (a) how courts interpret the same 
basic contractual language, and (b) what arguments they will 
find effective. This disparity makes it difficult for parties to an-
ticipate how a court might rule on the language of their con-
tract. All of this goes against the fundamental policy of contract 
law: ensuring predictability for parties.
154
 Aside from contradic-
tions in how courts have interpreted parties’ contracts, howev-
er, another issue exists in how courts have interpreted the 
FAA. 
B. COURTS MAY BE MISINTERPRETING 9 U.S.C. § 5 
Section 5 of 9 U.S.C., enacted as part of the FAA, is gener-
ally the source of courts’ power to decide whether to proceed 
with a case involving an exclusive arbitration forum dispute or 
whether to send it to arbitration.
155
 Two issues are at play with 
regard to 9 U.S.C. § 5. First, courts deciding exclusive arbitra-
tion forum disputes seem to be misinterpreting the policy in fa-
vor of arbitration as established by the FAA. Second, most 
courts are basing their decisions on precedent, without consult-
ing the text of 9 U.S.C. § 5 at all. 
1. The Policy in Favor of Arbitration Does Not Compel Courts 
To Remand Exclusive Arbitration Forum Agreements to 
 
integral to the arbitration agreement.”). 
 152. Cf. Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 
39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85, 106–07 (2003) (arguing that a higher 
standard probably applies to insurance contracts where both parties had equal 
bargaining power and mutually wrote the contract). 
 153. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 350 (“[I]t is a commonplace that 
practically no one reads, let alone understands, the . . . contracts of adhesion 
to which they assent.”). 
 154. See Steven N. Baker, Foreign Law Between Domestic Commercial Par-
ties: A Party Autonomy Approach with Particular Emphasis on North Carolina 
Law, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 437, 440 (2008) (noting that predictability and par-
ty expectations are fundamental values of contract law). 
 155. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see also supra Part I.B. 
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Arbitration 
The Supreme Court has often articulated a liberal policy in 
favor of arbitration in connection with the FAA.
156
 Accordingly, 
in many situations it seems that courts send cases to arbitra-
tion largely because of pro-arbitration policy,
157
 with courts of-
ten citing the FAA as the reason behind this policy.
158
 However, 
based on the legislative history of the FAA, this may be a hasty 
judgment on the courts’ part. 
There is essentially no legislative history behind § 5 of the 
FAA. However, legislative history exists for the FAA as a 
whole.
159
 United States courts were originally hostile to arbitra-
tion agreements and generally did not enforce them.
160
 In the 
early twentieth century, business groups began lobbying for 
federal legislation that would make arbitration agreements en-
forceable.
161
 The result of that lobbying was the FAA, which 
Congress passed in 1925 to place arbitration agreements on 
equal footing with other contract provisions.
162
 “A key purpose 
 
 156. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 
62 (1995).  
 157. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 355–56 (3d Cir. 2012) (send-
ing the case to arbitration simply because the court found the language of the 
contract ambiguous and had a policy in favor of arbitration); Diversicare Leas-
ing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011 WL 5827208, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 
18, 2011) (“The above facts must be viewed in light of the ‘liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements’ found in the FAA.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) (“It is difficult to justify the abrogation of an entire 
arbitration agreement, especially when Congress has provided in the Federal 
Arbitration Act an easy remedy for an arbitrator’s unavailability.”); cf. Green 
v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792–93 (7th Cir. 2013) (ques-
tioning the Integral-Ancillary Test, but noting that “[i]n recent years the Su-
preme Court has insisted that the Act not be added to in a way that overrides 
contracts to resolve disputes by arbitration” and ultimately sending the case to 
arbitration). 
 159. See generally Hal Neth, The Federal Arbitration Act and How It Grew 
12–13 (May 2011) (unpublished M.S. essay, University of Oregon), available at 
http://adr.uoregon.edu/files/2012/01/federalarbitrationact.pdf (discussing the 
history and the development of the FAA). 
 160. David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class 
Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 BUS. LAW. 
55, 58 (2007); see also Neth, supra note 159, at 12–13 (discussing how Ameri-
can courts generally refused to enforce arbitration agreements). 
 161. Neth, supra note 159, at 13. 
 162. Wilson Daniel “Dee” Miles, III, Partner, Beasley, Allen, Crow, 
Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., Address at the Conference on Life and Health 
Insurance Litigation: Arbitration (May 10, 2001), available at SF81 ALI-ABA 
157 (Westlaw) (“Historically, our courts were rightly opposed to arbitration, 
and the [FAA] was intended to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility to 
arbitration provisions that had existed at English common law and had been 
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of the [Federal Arbitration] Act was to make agreements to ar-
bitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’ ”
163
 
Thus, Congress enacted the FAA in order to ensure the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements.
164
 Still, the history of the 
FAA does not suggest that Congress intended the courts to 
send all parties with contracts containing any sort of arbitra-
tion clause to arbitration. Indeed, the text of the FAA suggests 
otherwise; 9 U.S.C. § 4, for example, only gives the courts pow-
er to remand any arbitral issue to arbitration “in accordance 
with the terms of [the parties’] agreement.”
165
 In fact, the Su-
preme Court has recognized this latter point, even in spite of its 
liberal policy in favor of arbitration.
166
 Rather, the legislative 
history of the FAA indicates that Congress simply wanted to 
ensure that courts do not invalidate arbitration agreements 
just because they are arbitration agreements.
167
 
That is not the issue in exclusive arbitration forum dis-
putes. A party with an exclusive arbitration forum dispute is 
not trying to persuade the court that the provision is and al-
ways has been unenforceable.
168
 That situation is more directly 
covered by the FAA’s policy.
169
 Instead, the party is trying to 
 
adopted by American courts and to place arbitration agreements upon the 
same footing with other contracts.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 163. Neth, supra note 159, at 13–14 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2010)). 
 164. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 165. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 166. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 473 (1989) (“But 
§ 4 of the FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at 
any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that ‘arbitration 
proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties’] agreement.’ ” (alteration in 
original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4)). 
 167. See Miles, supra note 162 (“A review of the legislative history of the 
Act demonstrates that . . . . [i]t was a result of the American Bar Association’s 
efforts to obtain Congressional authorization for federal courts to enforce arbi-
tration agreements in . . . interstate commercial contracts.”). 
 168. See, e.g., In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 
557 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The question we decide, however, is not whether share-
holder suits [like the present case] are arbitrable, but where this dispute—
whatever its nature—may be arbitrated under the agreements.”); see also 
Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff 
was not disputing whether the Terms and Agreements governed the contract, 
just whether the arbitration provision was still enforceable given that the 
NAF is no longer conducting consumer arbitrations). 
 169. Despite the policy, however, parties may still argue that an arbitra-
tion provision is in itself invalid for reasons that a court may find any contrac-
tual provision invalid. These reasons include fraud, forgery, mutual mistake, 
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convince a court that the arbitration agreement is no longer en-
forceable given the current circumstances—those being that the 
arbitration forum named in the contract cannot, or will not, ar-
bitrate the parties’ dispute.
170
 These circumstances are beyond 
the scope of what Congress intended when it passed the FAA. 
In fact, these decisions arguably go against the Supreme 
Court’s instruction that “[c]ourts must rigorously enforce arbi-
tration agreements according to their terms.”
171
 In an exclusive 
arbitration forum agreement, the terms indicate that the par-
ties, in some fashion, selected a particular arbitration forum to 
handle any disputes arising under the contract. Thus, by decid-
ing to send the case to arbitration in another forum simply be-
cause of pro-arbitration policy, instead of taking into account 
the exclusive designation of the original arbitration forum, 
courts may not be enforcing these exclusive arbitration agree-
ments according to their terms. 
2. Courts Are Basing Their Decisions on Precedent, Not on the 
Text of 9 U.S.C. § 5 
Whether the court can use the FAA to appoint a new arbi-
trator for the parties depends on the court’s interpretation of 
the term “lapse” in 9 U.S.C. § 5.
172
 To have the power to appoint 
a new arbitrator, a court must first make a finding that there 
was a “lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or 
umpire.”
173
 Courts are to look to the plain language when inter-
preting a statute.
174
 According to the Merriam-Webster Diction-
ary, the meaning of “lapse” is “a slight error typically due to 
forgetfulness or inattention.”
175
 The Oxford English Dictionary 
 
impossibility, unconscionability, and illegality. See Vimar Seguros y 
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 555 (1995). It is possible 
that these defenses may apply to exclusive arbitration forum disputes, but 
that is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 170. See, e.g., Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶¶ 9–10, 808 
N.W.2d 114, 117 (noting that the parties “agreed to arbitrate” but that, as the 
NAF was specified in the contract and is unavailable, the question is whether 
the court can appoint a substitute arbitrator). 
 171. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 
221 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see also supra Part I.B. 
 173. 9 U.S.C. § 5. 
 174. See Lamie v. U.S. Trs., 504 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established 
that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is 
to enforce it according to its terms.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 175. Lapse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/lapse (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
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similarly defines “lapse” as “a mistake, a slight error.”
176
 There-
fore, based on the plain language of the statute, a court can on-
ly appoint a new arbitrator under 9 U.S.C. § 5 if the parties 
made a small, accidental error in the naming of the arbitrator 
in the exclusive arbitration forum clause. 
One could argue that courts seem to be trying to determine 
whether there is a “lapse” through the Integral-Ancillary and 
Exclusivity Tests. This is because one could regard asking 
whether an arbitration forum is “integral” or “exclusive” as a 
way to decide whether the parties intended to arbitrate in gen-
eral or just via the designated forum and mistakenly agreed to 
a contract that suggested otherwise.
177
 However, if this is a sit-
uation of semantics, it would be better for courts to be clear 
about what they are looking for in exclusive arbitration forum 
clauses rather than leaving that determination up to unclear 
tests. 
Still, there is a larger issue with the tests courts have been 
using—in particular the Integral-Ancillary Test, which the ma-
jority of courts employ.
178
 “Integral” and “ancillary” do not ap-
pear anywhere in 9 U.S.C. § 5.
179
 Courts coined these terms, 
again presumably as tools for determining whether the contract 
does contain a “lapse” in naming an arbitrator.
180
 Unfortunate-
ly, these terms now seem to overshadow the actual language of 
the statute. For example, when the Third Circuit faced an ex-
clusive arbitration forum dispute for the first time in 2012, the 
court never explicitly discussed the language of the statute but 
spent paragraphs discussing the Integral-Ancillary Test.
181
 This 
is a problem because courts should not consult precedent before 
the statutory text and the statute’s purpose or context.
182
 
This issue, combined with the problematic ways courts in-
 
 176. THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1532 (Lesley Brown 
ed., 1993). 
 177. See supra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 178. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 745 S.E.2d 556, 567 (W. Va. 
2013) (“This [integral-ancillary] formulation of the application of section 5 of 
the FAA is the majority rule.”). 
 179. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
 180. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 
2013) (discussing the court’s skepticism with the way that courts have used 
the Integral-Ancillary Test). 
 181. See Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354–57 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 182. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 
1325, 1330 (2011) (stating that the interpretation of a phrase depends on 
“reading the whole statutory text” and “considering the purpose and context of 
the statute” before stating that it depends on “consulting any precedents or 
authorities that inform the analysis”). 
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terpret exclusive arbitration forum clauses and pro-arbitration 
policy, indicates that the precedent on exclusive arbitration fo-
rum disputes contains deep flaws. As such, practitioners and 
courts both need to work to improve the predictability and 
functionality of this area of law. 
III. BETTER CONTRACTS AND BETTER RULINGS  
As the previous discussions demonstrate, there are issues 
with how courts reach decisions on exclusive arbitration forum 
agreements. This Note proposes a two-part solution. First, Sec-
tion A discusses how practitioners may be able to fix some of 
these problems by drafting exclusive arbitration clauses more 
clearly. Better drafting would generally prevent these compli-
cated disputes from arising in the first place. Second, because it 
is unlikely that better drafting will solve these issues fully, 
courts need to take a more just and consistent approach to in-
terpreting exclusive arbitration forum agreements, as dis-
cussed in Section B. Only then will parties have the predictabil-
ity that they need in this area of contract law. 
A. THE ATTORNEYS’ PART: DRAFTING CLEARER EXCLUSIVE 
ARBITRATION FORUM CLAUSES 
Practitioners can resolve a portion of exclusive arbitration 
forum disputes by drafting better exclusive arbitration forum 
agreements. This might sound obvious, but it is clear from the 
number of exclusive arbitration forum disputes that have aris-
en since 2009 that many attorneys are drafting poor arbitration 
clauses.
183
 As such, when drafting exclusive arbitration forum 
agreements, attorneys can learn a few lessons from the mis-
takes of their colleagues. 
First, attorneys should be explicit in their contracts as to 
the parties’ expectations for arbitration. If the parties have only 
agreed to arbitration in a single forum, the attorney should 
make that clear in the contract. He or she can do so in several 
ways. Even though courts have interpreted exclusive arbitra-
tion forum language differently,
184
 an attorney stands the best 
chance of keeping the language unambiguous if he or she men-
tions the forum repeatedly throughout the contract.
185
 Fur-
 
 183. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 184. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 185. See, e.g., Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 38, 
150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (holding that the pervasive references to the NAF 
throughout the contract compelled the conclusion that the parties intended the 
NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator); Riley v. Extendicare Health Facilities, 
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thermore, the attorney should indicate that the parties wish to 
use that forum with strong and mandatory language.
186
 As to 
what constitutes mandatory language, courts have generally 
accepted the use of “shall,” i.e., “[the designated forum] shall 
govern the arbitration.”
187
 The attorney should avoid boilerplate 
phrases like “under the procedure of” a particular forum, as 
courts have ambivalently interpreted this language.
188
 On the 
other hand, if the parties wish to resolve disputes via arbitra-
tion regardless of whether a preferred forum is available, the 
contract should indicate this. The attorney should make this 
clear by emphasizing the parties’ desire to arbitrate generally, 
rather than though a particular forum, throughout the agree-
 
Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012); see also supra note 91 and accom-
panying text; cf. Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Nowlin, No. 11-CV-1037, 2011 
WL 5827208, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2011) (finding the NAF not integral to 
the contract partially because “reference to the NAF was minimal in the Arbi-
tration Agreement”). 
 186. See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (“Man-
datory, as opposed to permissive, contractual language further demonstrates 
that a specifically named arbitration provider is integral to the agreement to 
arbitrate.”); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (re-
viewing caselaw on mandatory language in exclusive arbitration forum dis-
putes and, in doing so, repeatedly indicating that “shall” constitutes mandato-
ry language); see also Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., No. 13-60066-CIV, 2013 WL 
1325327, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2013) (stating that the agreement, which used 
“shall” to designate the arbitrator, used mandatory language); Miller v. 
GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 686 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (indicating 
that the contract’s use of the mandatory words “shall” and “exclusively” to in-
dicate arbitration under the NAF Code of Procedure helped persuade the court 
to find that the parties had an exclusive agreement to arbitrate); Geneva-
Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) 
(discussing how the contract stated that the plaintiff “‘shall’ submit all claims 
to the NAF for arbitration” and how that included mandatory language). Of 
course, it is possible that language other than “shall” may qualify as mandato-
ry language, such as “will” or “must.” See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 
(1983) (indicating that the statute used “shall,” “will,” and “must,” which the 
Court called “language of an unmistakably mandatory character”). However, 
these types of phrases have not come up significantly before the courts, and 
the caselaw has shown that it can be difficult to predict how a court will inter-
pret the exclusive arbitration forum language of a contract. See, e.g., Meskill v. 
GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 976 (D. Minn. 2012) 
(suggesting that the court may have adjudicated the case if the contract had 
used “by and under” instead of “in accordance”). 
 188. See, e.g., Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that, in contrast to other cases, the contract before the 
court designates a particular forum instead of just the procedure for arbitra-
tion); Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(disagreeing with the district court and finding that “by and under” the NAF’s 
Code of Procedure does not constitute an exclusive arbitration forum agree-
ment); see also discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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ment.
189
 
Second, the contract should provide a contingency should 
the parties’ chosen arbitrator become unavailable. If the parties 
prefer to litigate in that event, the contract should indicate 
this. If the parties would still prefer to arbitrate, the contract 
should provide a means for selecting an alternative arbitrator. 
Although a court could still appoint a substitute arbitrator for 
the parties under 9 U.S.C. § 5,
190
 providing an alternative 
means in the contract would best serve the parties’ intentions. 
Aside from adding clarity to the agreement, drafting a contin-
gency is also important because courts have interpreted the 
lack of a contingency varyingly.
191
 
Third, the attorney should discuss exclusive arbitration fo-
rum provisions with his or her clients and ensure that they 
participate in making decisions regarding exclusive arbitration 
forum agreements. This is especially important if the parties 
only wish to resolve disputes in a single arbitral forum and liti-
gate otherwise. Some courts have sent cases to arbitration 
simply because the plaintiff produced no evidence that the arbi-
tration forum indicated in the contract was part of his or her 
decision to accept the terms of the contract.
192
 
Finally, the attorney should ensure that he or she is not 
specifying a defunct arbitration forum in the exclusive arbitra-
tion forum agreement. Although not using a defunct forum may 
seem readily apparent, this is a recurring cause of exclusive ar-
bitration forum disputes.
193
 Specifically, as discussed earlier, a 
 
 189. See, e.g., Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC, 2011 SD 95, ¶ 27, 808 
N.W.2d 114, 122 (sending the case to arbitration after noting that the contract 
made eighteen references to arbitration). 
 190. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); see also discussion supra notes 47–49 and ac-
companying text. 
 191. Compare Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933, 
at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009) (finding the contract’s lack of provision for an 
alternative arbitral forum as support for the NAF being the exclusive forum), 
with Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 3, 2009) (holding that the contract’s lack of provision for an alternative 
arbitral forum only lends ambiguity to the meaning of the arbitration clause). 
 192. See, e.g., Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 
(D.S.D. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff’s testimony supports a finding that 
the forum was not integral because she testified that “she did not negotiate 
the Arbitration Agreement, did not remember the Arbitration Agreement it-
self, but did not doubt that she signed the document”). 
 193. See, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (emphasiz-
ing that the defendant, in its contract, provided for arbitration by the NAF in 
2012 when the NAF closed in 2009); Laboratorios Grossman, S.A. v. Forest 
Labs., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (App. Div. 1968) (noting that the parties en-
tered into an agreement for arbitration via a forum that never existed); see al-
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number of cases have arisen because the parties agreed to arbi-
tration by the NAF after it stopped accepting new arbitrations 
in July 2009.
194
 To the mindful attorney, avoiding this problem 
comes down to being careful about what boilerplate language is 
(and more importantly is not) included in the contract. 
Of course, these recommendations assume three things. 
First, they assume that the parties are in agreement about ar-
bitration and want to be clear in their contract. Many times, 
parties intentionally draft contracts with open or vague 
terms.
195
 They may do so because of uncertainty, risk aversion, 
or a desire to avoid worrying about future contingencies, i.e., a 
desire to let a court worry about the ambiguity should a prob-
lem arise.
196
 If keeping an exclusive arbitration forum clause 
vague is in the client’s best interests, then so be it. However, in 
that situation, the attorney should discuss with his or her cli-
ent the pitfalls that may arise should the exclusive arbitration 
forum clause come before a court. Specifically, it may be hard to 
predict how a judge will interpret the language of a vague ex-
clusive arbitration forum clause.
197
 
Second, these recommendations assume that attorneys on 
both sides of a contract strive for ethical representation of their 
clients. By itself, this assumption is not too disconcerting be-
cause there are already checks on an attorney’s ethicality. For 
example, if the client’s attorney is doing his job, he should be 
able to catch anything the other side has placed in the contract 
 
so supra Part I.A. 
 194. See, e.g., Green, 724 F.3d at 789; Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley 
LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968–70 (D. Minn. 2012); Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, 
LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); see also supra note 38 and ac-
companying text. 
 195. See Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in the 
Interpretation of Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71, 76 (2009) 
(“Scholars have previously given attention to the benefits (especially economic) 
of lawyers intentionally drafting open, incomplete, and vague contracts . . . .”). 
 196. See H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: A Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretative Challenges, 21 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 303–04 (2011) (“Contract terms may be precise, 
vague or anywhere in between. . . . [W]hen parties choose a relatively open-
textured standard, they are decreasing their ex ante investment and increas-
ing their expected ex post enforcement costs. Rather than spending time and 
money worrying about future contingencies and terms specifying precise obli-
gations in light of those contingencies at the front end of the contracting pro-
cess, parties are choosing to delegate to a future tribunal the task of specifying 
precise obligations.”); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1006–07 (1992) (discussing how contracts are written 
with open terms because of uncertainty, the difficulty of writing and enforcing 
certain contracts with specific terms, and risk aversion). 
 197. See discussion supra Parts I.B, II.A. 
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in an attempt to “game” the system. 
Nevertheless, this second assumption becomes somewhat 
alarming when combined with a third assumption: both parties 
are equally represented by counsel. While sophisticated clients 
may be equally represented, this is generally not true of parties 
accepting contracts of adhesion.
198
 Such parties often have di-
minished bargaining power as well.
199
 Therefore, the drafting 
recommendations laid out in this Section are probably of lim-
ited utility to individuals who accept a contract of adhesion 
with an exclusive arbitration forum clause. For them, help 
must come from the courts. 
By following these four recommendations gleaned from ex-
clusive arbitration forum dispute caselaw, an attorney can de-
crease the chances that his or her client’s contract will become 
the subject of an exclusive arbitration forum dispute. Unfortu-
nately, for a party accepting a contract of adhesion with an ex-
clusive arbitration forum clause, these recommendations prob-
ably hold little value since such a party is not represented by 
counsel. Instead, those individuals must rely on the courts to 
provide them with an equitable outcome should an exclusive 
arbitration forum dispute arise. For this reason, courts must do 
a better job of writing decisions that are fair, predictable, and 
fully based in the language of 9 U.S.C. § 5.  
B. THE COURTS’ PART: WHAT THE COURTS NEED TO DO IN 
ORDER TO ENSURE PREDICTABLE AND EQUITABLE RESULTS FOR 
PARTIES WITH EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION FORUM DISPUTES 
Resolving an exclusive arbitration forum dispute requires 
interpreting the exclusive arbitration clause and applying 9 
U.S.C. § 5.
200
 Accordingly, courts must keep both of these as-
pects in mind when analyzing and ruling on an exclusive arbi-
tration forum dispute. Along these lines, this Note advances 
three simple recommendations to courts hearing these disputes 
that will allow for fairer and more consistent rulings. First, 
courts deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes should 
start applying a new test that is much more in line with the 
language of 9 U.S.C. § 5 than either the Integral-Ancillary or 
Exclusivity Test. Second, courts can, and should, use parol evi-
 
 198. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 346 (“A ‘contract of adhesion’ in the 
parlance of contract law, is a take-it-or-leave-it standard form agreement, 
usually presented to a consumer by a business entity.”); see also supra Part 
II.A.3. 
 199. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 200. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
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dence when interpreting the contracts of these disputes accord-
ing to this new test. Finally, courts should start taking con-
sumer protection policies into account when deciding exclusive 
arbitration forum disputes, particularly when those disputes 
involve contracts of adhesion. 
1. Clearer Application of 9 U.S.C. § 5 
The way courts currently apply 9 U.S.C. § 5 is convoluted. 
Instead of examining the text of the statute directly, courts use 
judicially-invented tests that (presumably) attempt to get at 
the underlying meaning of the statute.
201
 However, the dispari-
ty in courts’ application of these tests demonstrates that the 
tests themselves are ambiguous.
202
 Instead of using these tests, 
a court should simply ask some variation of the following ques-
tions: 
 
(1) Did the parties intend to contract for arbitration in  
general, and mistakenly agree to a contract that suggests  
they only wanted to arbitrate using a particular forum? or 
 
(2) Did the parties intend to contract for arbitration by a  
particular forum, and mistakenly agree to a contract that  
suggests they wanted to arbitrate in general? 
 
After deciding which of these questions better applies to the 
situation, the court should only appoint a new arbitrator if it 
finds the parties intended to contract for arbitration in general 
and only mistakenly agreed to a contract that suggests they 
wanted to arbitrate using a particular forum. 
This approach is much more straightforward and in line 
with the use of “lapse,” which colloquially means “a small mis-
take,” in the statute.
203
 Of course, even if courts adopt this “In-
tention Test” and apply 9 U.S.C. § 5 by asking these questions, 
deciding which question is applicable to the contract before the 
court will still require an exercise in contract interpretation, 
which is where much of the ambiguity in the exclusive arbitra-
tion forum caselaw arises. 
2. The Courts Should Give More Credence to Parol Evidence 
and Properly Examine the Context of Such Evidence when 
 
 201. See supra notes 172–82 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra Parts I.B., II.A.1. 
 203. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
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Interpreting the Parties’ Contract 
Whether a court decides to adopt the Intention Test or fol-
lows a different approach, the court must employ principles of 
contract interpretation in deciding the parties’ exclusive arbi-
tration forum dispute. Courts may use parol evidence to inter-
pret an ambiguous contract, and in exclusive arbitration forum 
disputes, increased use of parol evidence would help courts bet-
ter interpret parties’ contracts. Indeed, increasing the use of 
parol evidence in exclusive arbitration forum disputes would 
give courts greater insight into the parties’ intentions when 
they entered into the contract and decrease the need for guess-
ing.
204
 Moreover, by using more parol evidence, courts would be 
able to justify varying interpretations of the same language; 
they could point to external evidence demonstrating that the 
parties had different intentions when entering into the con-
tracts. Thus, even if courts reached opposite conclusions, other 
parties would be left with some guidance as to why the differ-
ent decisions occurred and thus how a court would rule on their 
particular contract. 
Moreover, as discussed, it is likely that even courts follow-
ing the conservative version of the parol evidence rule would be 
able to admit such evidence since these contracts’ ambiguity 
may potentially be established just by the fact that courts can-
not seem to agree on how to interpret the same basic exclusive 
arbitration forum clauses.
205
 One may argue that such a show-
ing itself constitutes external evidence that these strict courts 
cannot admit without a showing of ambiguity on the face of the 
contract, creating a chicken and egg problem. However, that 
argument seems unlikely to prevail. Parol evidence is “prior or 
contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior written agree-
ments, whose effect is to add to, vary, modify, or contradict the 
terms of a writing which the parties intend to be a final, com-
plete, and exclusive statement of their agreement.”
206
 Present-
ing exclusive arbitration dispute caselaw to a court does not fall 
into any of these categories. Moreover, it would be poor policy 
for courts to ignore the fact that exclusive arbitration forum 
clauses have been interpreted varyingly, as this would perpet-
 
 204. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, The Parol Evidence Rule and Admissibility of 
Extrinsic Evidence To Establish and Clarify Ambiguity in Written Contracts, 
40 A.L.R.3D 171, 235 (Supp. 2014) (“Presence of ambiguity in written agree-
ment permits reviewing court to examine extrinsic evidence in effort to clarify 
intent of parties.”). 
 205. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text. 
 206. 11 LORD, supra note 126, at § 33.1. 
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uate the problems that exist in the caselaw and that this Note 
is trying to address. 
Even for those courts currently admitting parol evidence to 
interpret these clauses, there is still a problem with how they 
have been using it. Courts that have examined parol evidence 
when deciding an exclusive arbitration forum dispute have 
generally looked at the rules or procedures of the forum indi-
cated in the contract,
207
 or party testimony and the record.
208
 
Courts have relied on forum procedure differently depending on 
how they have interpreted the procedure’s language.
209
 Howev-
er, as discussed earlier, nearly all courts have ignored the fact 
that party testimony or a record showing that the plaintiff(s) 
did not consider the indicated arbitration forum as important 
when entering into the contract is often in the context of the 
contract being a take-it-or-leave-it contract of adhesion.
210
 
Courts thus need to take this context into account when decid-
ing an exclusive arbitration forum dispute involving a contract 
of adhesion. 
One may argue that taking this context into account when 
reviewing party testimony or the record is unfair to the other 
party. This argument is unfounded. First, taking context into 
account does not mean that the court should make a presump-
tion in favor of the accepting party to a contract of adhesion. It 
 
 207. See, e.g., Klima v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, No. 
10-cv-1390-JAR-JPO, 2011 WL 5412216, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2011); Rivera 
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 35, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 
803; see also supra notes 95–98. 
 208. See Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 
975 (D. Minn. 2012); Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 
(D.S.D. 2010); Ex parte Warren, 718 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. 1998). 
 209. Compare, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 
789–90 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that, even though the NAF Code states that 
only the NAF can apply it, any arbitrator could actually use NAF Code and so 
the court could appoint a new arbitrator who would use the NAF Code accord-
ing to the agreement), with Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 35, 150 N.M. 398, 259 
P.3d 803 (rejecting this argument). 
 210. See Selby v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., No. 12cv01562 
AJB(BGS), 2013 WL 1315841, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“Plaintiff has 
not established, or even argued, that she would not have entered into the un-
derlying Agreement in the event of the NAF’s unavailability to arbitrate the 
resulting disputes.”); Meskill, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (“[T]here is nothing in 
the record indicating that [the plaintiff] was even aware of the NAF (or its 
Code) when he signed the Arbitration Agreement.”); Jones, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 
1168 (“[The plaintiff] testified that she did not . . . remember the Arbitration 
Agreement itself, but did not doubt that she signed the document . . . .”); War-
ren, 718 So. 2d at 49 (“There is no evidence that [the plaintiff] or [the defend-
ant] intended their choice of an arbitrator to be an essential term of the con-
tract . . . .”); see also supra Part II.A.2.  
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simply means that the court should not assume that the parol 
evidence means more than it does. For example, if the court 
does take context into account with respect to the plaintiff’s 
testimony, the testimony will probably not advance either side’s 
arguments. It will only stand for the proposition that the plain-
tiff did not intend anything with regard to the exclusive arbi-
tration forum clause.
211
 But even if taking context into account 
means making a presumption against the party that wrote the 
contract, doing so would be justified in many cases. Contracts 
of adhesion are usually slanted toward the drafting party, as 
that party had expert advice in preparing the contract.
212
 More-
over, the accepting party has no choice but to accept or reject 
the contract.
213
 The drafting party thus has the ability (and in-
centive) to draft terms in his or her favor.
214
 As such, a pre-
sumption against the drafting party in considering the context 
of parol evidence would, at worst, put the parties on equal foot-
ing in most exclusive arbitration forum disputes. 
As for the mechanics of taking context into account, utiliz-
ing the Intention Test discussed above
215
 may inherently help 
with this issue. As noted, courts usually employ the Integral-
Ancillary Test in deciding whether to adjudicate the parties’ 
dispute or send it to arbitration.
216
 In the context of this test, 
the plaintiff’s testimony or a record stating that the plaintiff 
did not consider the arbitration clause seems to go against the 
idea that the identity of the forum is integral to the contract. 
However, the proposed Intention Test advocates for courts to 
make a ruling by looking directly at the parties’ intentions 
when they entered into the exclusive arbitration forum agree-
ment.
217
 Therefore, by using the questions in the Intention Test, 
 
 211. See discussion supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 212. Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties 
of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 681, 688 (2006) (“In short, contracts of 
adhesion allow one party to impose terms on another unwilling or unsuspect-
ing party. This occurs because the party that drafts the contract usually has 
had the advantage of time and expert advice in preparing the contract, almost 
inevitably producing a contract slanted in that party’s favor.”). 
 213. See id. (“Even when the non-drafting party has the opportunity to 
read the contract, that party usually lacks any meaningful choice but to accept 
the contract—because of a lack of alternatives and because of the accepting 
party’s severely disproportionate bargaining position.”). 
 214. See Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney’s Fee Clauses: A Proposal To 
Shift to the Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 91 (2012) (“[T]he stronger party 
is able to draft the contract to its advantage without fear of negotiation from 
the weaker party.”). 
 215. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 216. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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it may become clearer to courts that the party accepting an ad-
hesion contract may not have understood or even considered 
the exclusive arbitration forum clause when entering into the 
contract. 
Overall, courts should more frequently use parol evidence 
to ascertain the parties’ intentions in entering into a contract. 
Doing so would take much of the conjecture out of interpreting 
exclusive arbitration forum clauses. Moreover, courts should be 
aware that most of these contracts are contracts of adhesion. 
Courts should consider this when evaluating parol evidence, in-
stead of just using it as support for a supposition of general ar-
bitration. However, this second point raises a compelling ques-
tion: If one of the parties did not have any intention when it 
came to the exclusive arbitration forum clause, how should the 
court decide? 
3. Courts Should Use Consumer Protection Policy To Help 
Them Decide Exclusive Arbitration Forum Disputes, Especially 
when the Contract Specifies Arbitration by the NAF 
Courts are allowed to use policy to help them decide a 
case.
218
 Many courts facing exclusive arbitration forum disputes 
already do so by referencing the fact that there is a liberal fed-
eral policy in favor of arbitration.
219
 As discussed above, it is 
possible that courts may be misapprehending the situation 
when they apply this policy to exclusive arbitration forum dis-
putes.
220
 However, this is less of a concern than the fact that 
this is often the only policy that courts (at least explicitly) ap-
ply.
221
 When the contract is a contract of adhesion, this becomes 
more problematic because of the power contracts of adhesion 
give to the drafting party.
222
 
Courts should take consumer protection policies into ac-
count when dealing with a contract of adhesion including an 
 
 218. Cf. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determin-
ing the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory 
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and poli-
cy.” (emphasis added)). 
 219. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 
discussion supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 221. See, e.g., Khan, 669 F.3d 350 (applying only pro-arbitration policy); 
Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 WL 4580739 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) 
(same). 
 222. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 351 (discussing how some scholars 
have attacked contracts of adhesion because they allow business interests to 
dominate). 
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exclusive arbitration forum clause. As examined above, accept-
ing parties may not have even considered the exclusive arbitra-
tion forum clause when entering into the contract, which makes 
finding the intention of the parties difficult.
223
 However, the 
mere fact that many of these contracts specify arbitration by 
the NAF, at times even after the NAF stopped accepting con-
sumer arbitrations,
224
 is disconcerting. It suggests that the 
drafting party in these situations may not have had the accept-
ing party’s best interests at heart—just the opposite, as the 
NAF was shut down for fraudulent bias against consumers.
225
 
Indeed, many of these drafting parties may have designated 
the NAF because of its bias against consumers. And in the case 
of drafting parties that designated the NAF as the exclusive 
arbitration forum after July 2009, it makes one wonder wheth-
er such drafting parties were being “negligent or deliberately 
deceptive.”
226
 
Yet, many courts do not consider this fact when deciding 
an exclusive arbitration forum dispute, even though the majori-
ty of these disputes in recent years have gone to court because 
the NAF stopped accepting arbitrations.
227
 This is not fair to the 
accepting party. Moreover, it undermines the consumer protec-
tion reasons for which the Minnesota Attorney General shut 
down the NAF.
228
 This is not to say that courts should neces-
sarily adjudicate all and any exclusive arbitration forum dis-
putes that involve the NAF. But courts should at least take 
note of the reasons why businesses started using the NAF in 
the first place and be suspicious of a designation of the NAF as 
the exclusive arbitration forum, particularly in a contract of 
adhesion.
229
 The same holds true for any exclusive arbitration 
 
 223. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 224. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 789 (7th 
Cir. 2013); see also discussion supra notes 38 & 194 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Firm Agrees To End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, supra note 8; 
see also discussion supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
 226. Green, 724 F.3d at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
 227. For example, in Green, the dissent complained about how the majority 
ignored this fact in its decision. Id. The dissent expressed similar sentiments 
in Khan v. Dell Inc. 669 F.3d 350, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2012) (Sloviter, J., dissent-
ing) (“The majority avoids any discussion of the underlying reason why arbi-
tration by NAF is unavailable. . . . It cannot be insignificant that Dell named 
NAF as the exclusive forum in its arbitration clauses.”). 
 228. See Berner, supra note 25; see also discussion supra notes 22–28 and 
accompanying text. 
 229. See generally Berner & Grow, supra note 28, at 72–74 (discussing the 
unethical practices of the NAF). In Meskill v. GGNSC Stillwater Greeley LLC, 
the court did discuss the defendant’s choice of the NAF as the exclusive arbi-
tration forum in the contract of adhesion and why the NAF stopped accepting 
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forum clause that specifies a forum that the court notes may be 
biased in favor of the drafting party.
230
 
Altogether, courts can start reaching more predictable and 
equitable outcomes for parties with an exclusive arbitration fo-
rum dispute by following the recommendations discussed in 
this Part. Specifically, courts should look more explicitly at the 
parties’ intentions, use more parol evidence, take into account 
the context of that evidence, and remember to consult consum-
er protection policies. When combined with more careful draft-
ing of exclusive arbitration forum clauses, much of the confu-
sion within the field of exclusive arbitration forum disputes can 
be avoided in the future. 
  CONCLUSION   
Courts are split on how to decide whether to adjudicate an 
exclusive arbitration forum dispute or appoint a new arbitrator 
for the parties. Although most use the Integral-Ancillary Test, 
courts apply the test differently. Moreover, the test itself may 
be misapplying 9 U.S.C. § 5, from which most courts gain the 
power to appoint a new arbitrator. Aside from concerns with 
the Integral-Ancillary Test, courts have interpreted very simi-
lar contractual language creating an exclusive arbitration fo-
rum clause in contradictory ways. To overcome these issues, 
practitioners must learn from the mistakes of their colleagues 
and draft these agreements more carefully. However, since 
many of these contracts are contracts of adhesion, this sugges-
tion can only go so far. For the sake of accepting parties to con-
tracts of adhesion, courts should be more consistent and equi-
table when deciding exclusive arbitration forum disputes. 
Courts can achieve this by focusing on the parties’ intentions, 
 
consumer arbitrations. 862 F. Supp. 2d 966, 977 (D. Minn. 2012). The court 
even considered the fact that the parties entered into the agreement after July 
2009. Id. Nevertheless, the court decided not to hold these facts against the 
defendant, reasoning that “[n]othing in the Minnesota Attorney General’s ac-
tion against the NAF implicated [the defendant].” Id. at 977–78. Although this 
author disagrees with some of the court’s conclusions, at least the court in 
Meskill fully considered the NAF’s history and decided that it wasn’t relevant 
to the case before it. That is more consumer policy consideration than most 
courts give to these cases. 
 230. For example, the arbitration clause in Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc. 
specified arbitration by a forum that never conducted arbitrations. 768 F.3d 
1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2014). The concurring judge supported the decision be-
cause he found the exclusive arbitration forum clause unconscionable “not just 
because of unequal bargaining power, but because of [the defendant’s] actions 
[the plaintiff] had no ability or opportunity to understand the forum selection 
clause.” Id. at 1355 (Restani, J., concurring). 
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using more parol evidence and taking into account the context 
of such evidence, and remembering to consult consumer protec-
tion policies where they apply. By following these recommenda-
tions, together courts and attorneys can decrease the number of 
exclusive arbitration forum disputes and improve the cohesive-
ness of this field of law. 
